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Scientific research funding is allocated largely through a system of soliciting and ranking com-
petitive grant proposals. In these competitions, the proposals themselves are not the deliverables
that the funder seeks, but instead are used by the funder to screen for the most promising research
ideas. Consequently, some of the funding program’s impact on science is squandered because ap-
plying researchers must spend time writing proposals instead of doing science. To what extent
does the community’s aggregate investment in proposal preparation negate the scientific impact of
the funding program? Are there alternative mechanisms for awarding funds that advance science
more efficiently? We use the economic theory of contests to analyze how efficiently grant proposal
competitions advance science, and compare them with recently proposed, partially randomized al-
ternatives such as lotteries. We find that the effort researchers waste in writing proposals may be
comparable to the total scientific value of the research that the funding supports, especially when
only a few proposals can be funded. Moreover, when professional pressures motivate investigators
to seek funding for reasons that extend beyond the value of the proposed science (e.g., promotion,
prestige), the entire program can actually hamper scientific progress when the number of awards is
small. We suggest that lost efficiency may be restored either by partial lotteries for funding, or by
funding researchers based on past scientific success instead of proposals for future work.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, research funding in the
United States has failed to keep pace with growth in
scientific activity. Funding rates in grant competitions
have plummeted (Fig. S1, [1–4]) and researchers spend
far more time writing grant proposals than they did in
the past [5]. A large survey of top U.S. universities found
that, on average, faculty devote 8% of their total time —
and 19% of their time available for research activities
— towards preparing grant proposals [6]. Anecdotally,
medical school faculty may spend fully half their time or
more seeking grant funding [5, 7]. While the act of writ-
ing a proposal may have some intrinsic scientific value
[8] — perhaps by helping an investigator sharpen ideas
— much of the effort given to writing proposals is ef-
fort taken away from doing science [9]. With respect to
scientific progress, this time is wasted [10].
Frustrated with the inefficiencies of the current fund-
ing system, some researchers have called for an overhaul
of the prevailing funding model [9, 11–18]. In particular,
Fang & Casadevall [16] recently suggested a partial lot-
tery, in which proposals are rated as worthy of funding
or not, and then a subset of the worthy proposals are
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randomly selected to receive funds. Arguments in favor
of a partial lottery include reduced demographic and sys-
temic bias, increased transparency, and a hedge against
the impossibility of forecasting how scientific projects will
unfold [16]. Indeed, at least three funding organizations
— New Zealand’s Health Research Council and their Sci-
ence for Technological Innovation program, as well as the
Volkswagen Foundation [19] — have recently begun using
partial lotteries to fund riskier, more exploratory science.
Compared with a proposal competition, a lottery per-
mits more proposals to qualify for funding and thus low-
ers the bar that applicants must clear. A lottery also
offers a lower reward for success, as a successful proposal
receives a chance at funding, not a guarantee of funding.
Thus we expect that investigators applying to a partial
lottery will invest less time and fewer resources in writ-
ing a proposal. To a first approximation, then, a proposal
competition funds high-value projects while wasting sub-
stantial researcher time on proposal preparation, whereas
a partial lottery would fund lower-value projects on aver-
age but would reduce the time wasted writing proposals.
It is not obvious which system will have the greater net
benefit for scientific progress.
In this article, we study the merits and costs of tra-
ditional proposal competitions versus partial lotteries by
situating both within the rich economic theory of con-
tests. In this theory, competing participants make costly
investments (“bids”) in order to win one or more prizes
[20, 21]. Participants differ in key attributes, such as
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2ability and opportunity cost, that determine their op-
timal strategies. In an economics context, contests are
often used by the organizer as a mechanism to elicit ef-
fort from the participants. For example, TopCoder and
Kaggle are popular contest platforms for tech firms (the
organizers) to solicit programming or data-analysis effort
from freelance workers (the participants). However, be-
cause the participants’ attributes influence their optimal
strategies, the bids that participants submit reveal those
attributes. Thus, screening of participants often arises as
a side effect.
In funding competitions, the organizer is a funding
body and the participants are competing investigators.
Investigators pitch project ideas of varying scientific
value by preparing costly proposals. However, unlike
a traditional economic contest, the funding body’s pri-
mary objective is to identify the most promising science,
using proposals to screen for high-value ideas. The fund-
ing body has little interest in eliciting work during the
competition itself, as the proposals are not the deliver-
ables the funder seeks. All else equal, the funding agency
would prefer to minimize the work that goes into prepar-
ing proposals, to leave as much time as possible for in-
vestigators to do science. In this case, how should the
funder organize the contest to support promising science
without squandering much of the program’s benefit on
time wasted writing proposals?
Below, we pursue this question by presenting and ana-
lyzing a contest model for scientific funding competitions.
We first use the model to assess the efficiency of proposal
competitions for promoting scientific progress, and ask
how that efficiency depends on how many proposals are
funded. We next explore how efficiency is impacted when
extra-scientific incentives such as professional advance-
ment motivate scientists to pursue funding, and compare
the efficiency of proposal competitions versus partial lot-
teries. Finally, we reflect on alternative ways to improve
the efficiency of funding competitions without adding in-
tentional randomness to the award process. All of our
analyses focus on equilibrium behavior, and thus per-
tain most directly to long-standing funding competitions
for which researchers can acquire experience that informs
their future actions.
A CONTEST MODEL FOR SCIENTIFIC
FUNDING COMPETITIONS
Our model draws upon a framework for contests de-
veloped by Moldovanu & Sela [20]. In our application,
a large number of scientists (or research teams) compete
for grants to be awarded by a funding body. The funder
can fund a proportion p of the competing investigators.
We call p the payline, although p could be smaller than
the proportion of investigators who are funded if some
investigators do not enter the competition.
Project ideas vary in their scientific value, which we
write as v, where v ≥ 0. In this case, scientific value com-
bines the abilities of the investigator and the promise of
the idea itself. Although we do not assign specific units
to v, scientific value can be thought of as some measure of
scientific progress, such as the expected number of pub-
lications or discoveries. We assume that the funder seeks
to advance science by maximizing the scientific value of
the projects that it funds, minus the value of the science
that investigators forgo while writing proposals. How-
ever, the funder cannot observe the value of a project
idea directly. Instead the funder evaluates proposals for
research projects, and awards grants to the top-ranked
proposals. Assume that proposals can be prepared to
different strengths, denoted x ≥ 0, with a larger value of
x corresponding to a stronger proposal. A scientist with
a project idea of value v must decide how much effort
to invest in writing a proposal, that is, to what strength
x her proposal should be prepared. In our model, this
decision is made by a cost-benefit optimization.
On the benefit side, if a proposal is funded, the inves-
tigator receives a reward equal to the scientific value of
the project, or v. This reward is public, in the sense that
it benefits both the investigator and the funder. Receiv-
ing a grant may also bestow an extra-scientific reward on
the recipient, such as prestige, promotion, or professional
acclaim. Write this extra-scientific reward as v0 ≥ 0.
This extra-scientific reward is private, as it benefits only
the grant recipient, and not the funder. Let η(x) be
the equilibrium probability that a proposal of strength
x is funded; η(x) will be a non-decreasing function of x.
Thus, in expectation, an investigator with a project of
value v who prepares a proposal of strength x receives a
benefit of (v0 + v)η(x).
Preparing a grant proposal also entails a disutility cost,
equal to the value of the science that the investigator
could have produced with the time and resources invested
in writing. Let c(v, x) give the disutility cost of preparing
a proposal of strength x for a project of value v. Here,
we study the case where c(v, x) is a separable function of
v and x, so we set c(v, x) = g(v)h(x). Proposal compe-
titions are effective screening devices because it is easier
to write a strong proposal about a good idea than about
a poor one. Therefore, g(v) is a decreasing function of
v, i.e., g′(v) < 0. For a given idea, it takes more work
to write a stronger proposal, and thus h′(x) > 0. Fi-
nally, we assume that preparing a zero-strength proposal
is tantamount to opting out of the competition, which
can be done at zero cost. Thus h(0) = 0.
Preparing a proposal has some scientific value of its
own through the sharpening of ideas that writing a pro-
posal demands [8]. Let k ∈ [0, 1) be the proportion of
the disutility cost c(v, x) that an investigator recoups by
honing her ideas. We call the recouped portion of the
disutility cost the intrinsic scientific value of writing a
proposal. The portion of the disutility cost that cannot
be recouped is scientific waste.
All told, the total benefit to the investigator of prepar-
ing a proposal to strength x is (v0 + v)η(x) + kc(v, x),
and the total cost is c(v, x). The difference between the
3benefit and the cost is the investigator’s payoff. The in-
vestigator’s optimal proposal (or, in economic terms, her
“bid”) maximizes this payoff (Fig. 1):
b(v) = arg max
x
{(v0 + v)η(x)− (1− k)c(v, x)} . (1)
For simplicity, we assume that variation among projects
is captured entirely in the distribution of v, which we
write as F (v). We assume that v0 and k have common
values shared by all investigators. In the appendix we
show that our results extend to cases where v0 or k vary
among investigators, as long as they are perfectly corre-
lated with v.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Benefit
Cost
Strength of grant proposal (x)
Be
ne
fit
 o
r c
os
t
FIG. 1. An investigator prepares her grant proposal
to the strength that maximizes her payoff. The blue
curve shows the expected benefit to the investigator, which
is determined by the project’s value, any extra-scientific re-
ward that the investigator receives from getting the grant,
the probability of receiving funding, and the intrinsic value of
writing a proposal. The red curve shows the disutility cost of
preparing a proposal. The investigator’s payoff is the differ-
ence between the benefit and the cost. The vertical line shows
the bid (eq. 1) — the proposal strength that maximizes the
payoff. At the bid, the ratio of the payoff (given by the length
of the solid vertical line) to the cost (given by the length of
the dashed vertical line) gives the investigator’s return on her
investment.
The challenge in finding the payoff-maximizing bid b(v)
is that the equilibrium probability of funding, η(x), must
be determined endogeneously, in a way that is consistent
with both the payline p and the distribution of bids that
investigators submit. In Appendix S1, we follow Hoppe
et al. [22] to show that, at equilibrium, the bid function
is given by
b(v) = h−1
[
1
1− k
∫ v
0
v0 + t
g(t)
ξ′(t) dt
]
. (2)
In eq. 2, ξ(v) = η(b(v)) is the equilibrium probability
that an idea of value v is funded. The particular form
of ξ(v) depends on how much randomness is introduced
during the review process, which we discuss below.
By comparison, Moldovanu & Sela [20] considered a
contest with a small number of competitors, in which
the contest’s judges observe x directly. In their set-up,
each contestant is uncertain about the strength of her
competition (that is, her competitors’ types, v), but she
can be certain that the strongest bid will win the top
prize. In our case, we assume that the applicant pool is
large enough that the strength of the competition (i.e.,
the distribution of v among the applicants) is predictable.
However, the funding agency does not observe x directly,
but instead convenes a review panel to assess each pro-
posal’s strength. Variability among reviewers’ opinions
then introduces an element of chance into which propos-
als get funded.
Scientific efficiency
We use the model to explore how efficiently the grant
competition advances science. From the perspective of
an individual investigator, the investigator’s return on
her investment (ROI) is the ratio of her payoff to the
cost of her bid:
Investigator’s ROI =
(v0 + v)η(b(v))− (1− k)c(v, b(v))
c(v, b(v))
.
(3)
An investigator will never choose to write a proposal that
generates a negative payoff, because she can always ob-
tain a payoff of 0 by opting out. (If the investigator opts
out, eq. 3 evaluates to 0/0, in which case we define her
ROI to be 0.) Thus, an investigator’s equilibrium ROI
must be ≥ 0.
To analyze the funding program’s impact on scientific
progress as a whole, we compare the total value of the
science that the funding program supports with the total
value of the science that has been squandered preparing
proposals. Of course, both of these quantities will be
confounded with the number of grants that are funded,
so we standardize to a per-funded-proposal basis. In no-
tation, the average scientific value per funded proposal
is
1
p
∫
vη(b(v)) dF (v), (4)
and the average scientific waste per funded proposal is
1
p
∫
(1− k)c(v, b(v)) dF (v). (5)
We will refer to the difference between these two quanti-
ties as the scientific gain (or loss, should it be negative)
per funded proposal, which is our measure of the funding
program’s scientific efficiency.
Note that while an investigator will never enter a grant
competition against her own self interest, there is no
guarantee that the scientific value per funded proposal
will exceed the scientific waste. This is because the inves-
tigator’s payoff includes private, extra-scientific rewards
obtained by winning a grant (v0), and (in our account-
ing, at least) these extra-scientific rewards do not benefit
the funding agency. If extra-scientific motivations for
winning grants are large enough, investigators may enter
4a grant competition even when doing so decreases their
scientific productivity. If enough investigators are moti-
vated accordingly, then the scientific progress sacrificed
to writing proposals could exceed the scientific value of
the funding program. In this case, the grant competi-
tion would operate at a loss to science, and the fund-
ing agency could do more for science by eschewing the
proposal competition and spreading the money evenly
among active researchers in the field, or by giving the
money to researchers selected entirely at random.
ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
We illustrate the model’s behavior by choosing a few
possible sets of parameter values. Our parameter choices
are not directly informed by data. Thus, while the nu-
merical examples illustrate the model’s possible behav-
ior, we highlight the results that are guaranteed to hold
in general. Throughout, we use the following baseline
set of parameters. We assume that the project values, v,
have a triangular distribution ranging from vmin = 0.25
to vmax = 1 with a mode at vmin, such that low-value
ideas are common and high-value ideas are rare (i.e.,
F (v) = 1 − (16/9)(1 − v)2). For the cost function, we
choose c(v, x) = x2/v. We choose a convex dependence
on x to suggest that the marginal cost of improving a
proposal increases as the proposal becomes stronger. We
assume that the intrinsic scientific value of writing a pro-
posal allows investigators to recoup k = 1/3 of the disu-
tility cost of proposal preparation. We first explore the
case when investigators are motivated purely by the sci-
entific value of their projects (v0 = 0), and then introduce
extra-scientific benefits (v0 = 0.25). In the Supporting
Information, we provide parallel results with two alter-
native parameter sets.
The evaluation process by which review panels rank
proposals introduces a layer of randomness to the award-
ing of grants [23–25]. To capture noisy assessment, we use
a bivariate copula [26] to specify the joint distribution of
a proposal’s actual quantile, and its quantile as assessed
by the funding agency’s review panel. A bivariate copula
is a probability distribution on the unit square that has
uniformly distributed marginals, as all quantiles must.
We use a Clayton copula [27], which allows for accurate
assessment of weak proposals, but noisier assessment of
strong proposals (Fig. S2). This choice is motivated by
the pervasive notion that review panels can readily dis-
tinguish strong proposals from weak ones, but struggle
to discriminate among strong proposals [16, 25, 28]. A
Clayton copula has a single parameter (θ) that controls
how tightly its two components are correlated. Rather
arbitrarily, we use θ = 10 in the baseline parameter set.
The Clayton copula has the important property that a
proposal’s probability of funding increases monotonically
as its strength increases, regardless of the payline. Thus,
we exclude the possibility that panels systematically fa-
vor weaker proposals. By using a copula, we implicitly
assume that η(x) depends on x only through its rank. In
Appendix S1, we show how a copula leads to an equation
for ξ′(v), which can then be plugged in to eq. 2.
Fig. 2 shows numerical results for the baseline param-
eters at generous (p = 45%) and low (p = 15%) paylines.
In this particular case, investigators’ payoffs fall faster
than costs as paylines drop, leading to a reduced ROI
for everyone at the lower payline (Fig. 2B). We will ar-
gue below that every investigator’s ROI must inevitably
fall when the payline becomes small (see Figs. S3–S4 for
additional examples).
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FIG. 2. Diminishing paylines reduce investigators’ re-
turns on their investments in a proposal competition.
A: Equilibrium benefit (blue or green) and cost (red) curves
for an investigator with a project at the 90th percentile of v
in a proposal competition. The blue and green curves show
the benefit at a 45% and 15% payline, respectively. Verti-
cal lines show the investigator’s equilibrium bid, with solid
portions giving the investigator’s payoff, and dashed portions
showing the cost. The corner in the benefit curves appears at
the strongest proposal submitted. B: An investigator’s ROI
(eq. 3) in a proposal competition with 45% (solid line) or
15% (dashed line) paylines, as a function of the quantile of
the scientific value of her project, F (v). These curves also
give the investigator’s ROI in a partial lottery with a 45%
or 15% lottery line, and any payline. These results use the
baseline parameters.
From the funding agency’s perspective, with our base-
line parameters, both the average scientific value and
average waste per funded proposal increase as the pay-
line falls, for paylines below 50% (Fig. 3A). However, as
the payline decreases, waste escalates more quickly than
scientific value, reducing the scientific gain per funded
project (Fig. 3B). This same result also appears in our
alternative parameter sets (Fig. S5–S6). We will argue
below that the decline in scientific efficiency at low pay-
lines is an inevitable if unfortunate characteristic of pro-
posal competitions.
Clearly, quantitative details of the model’s predictions
depend on the parameter inputs. To understand the
robustness of these predictions, it helps to study the
case where panels discriminate perfectly among propos-
als. While perfect discrimination is obviously unrealistic
in practice, it yields a powerful and general set of results
that illuminate how the model behaves when discrimi-
nation is imperfect. Numerical results for perfect dis-
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FIG. 3. Both decreasing paylines and extra-scientific
rewards to investigators reduce the scientific effi-
ciency of the funding program. A: Both the average
scientific value per funded proposal (blue line, eq. 4) and the
average waste per funded proposal (red lines, eq. 5) are higher
for lower paylines, for the baseline parameter set and paylines
≤ 50%. The solid red line shows costs when investigators are
motivated only by the scientific value of the funded research
(v0 = 0); the dashed red line shows costs when investigators
are additionally motivated by private, extra-scientific rewards
(v0 = 0.25). Note that the vertical axis does not extend to 0.
B: The scientific gain or loss per funded proposal is lower for
lower paylines, both in the absence (v0 = 0, solid line) and
presence (v0 = 0.25, dashed line) of extra-scientific benefits
to investigators. Values of other parameters are as specified
in the main text. Identical results hold if the horizontal axis
is re-interpreted as the proportion of proposals that qualify
for a lottery, regardless of the payline.
crimination under the baseline parameter set appear in
Figs. S7–S8.
At equilibrium under perfect assessment, every project
above a threshold value v? = F−1(1 − p) will receive
funding, and no project idea below this threshold will
be funded. Investigators with projects of value v > v?
all prepare proposals to the identical strength x? =
h−1 [(v0 + v?)/((1− k)g(v?))], and are funded with cer-
tainty. Investigators with projects of value v < v? opt
out (Fig. S7). All of the subsequent results follow. (De-
tails appear in Appendix S1.) First, as paylines drop, all
investigators realize either a diminishing or zero ROI, be-
cause investigators who remain in the competition must
pay a higher cost for a reduced payoff. Second, the av-
erage scientific value per funded proposal must increase
as paylines drop, because only the highest-value projects
are funded under low paylines. Third, in the limiting
case when only one of many proposals can be funded
(technically, the limit as p approaches 0 from above), the
scientific value and scientific waste associated with the
last funded project converge, and science is no better off
than if no grant had been given at all (Fig. S8).
With perfect assessment, there is no general relation-
ship between the scientific efficiency of a proposal com-
petition and the payline that holds across the full range
of paylines (but see Hoppe et al. [22] for a sharp result
when the cost function is independent of v). Of course,
we wouldn’t expect scientific efficiency to decline mono-
tonically with a falling payline, because there are likely
to be some low-value projects that can be weeded out at
low cost. However, our last result above guarantees that
the scientific gain per funded proposal must eventually
vanish as the payline declines to a single award.
Returning to the reality of imperfect discrimination, as
long as review panels do not systematically favor weaker
proposals, noisy assessment changes little about these
qualitative results. That is, investigators’ ROIs will drop
as paylines fall, the average scientific value per funded
proposal will increase as paylines decrease, and the sci-
entific efficiency of the proposal competition must even-
tually decline as the payline approaches a single award.
But efficiency need not drop to zero. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, imperfect discrimination is a saving grace at
low paylines. Noisy assessment discourages top inves-
tigators from pouring excessive effort into grant-writing
as paylines fall, because the marginal benefit of writing
an even better grant becomes small when review panels
struggle to discriminate among top proposals. Indeed,
noisy assessment, unlike perfect discrimination, allows a
proposal competition to retain a positive impact on sci-
ence even with a single funded grant (compare Figs. 3
and S8). This result hints at the salutary nature of ran-
domness at low paylines, which we will see more vividly
when we consider lotteries below.
Thus far, we have considered the case where investi-
gators are motivated only by the scientific value of the
projects proposed (v0 = 0). Now suppose that investi-
gators are additionally motivated by the extra-scientific
benefits of receiving a grant, such as professional ad-
vancement or prestige (v0 > 0). Eq. 2 shows that adding
extra-scientific motivation will increase the effort that in-
vestigators devote to preparing grant proposals. How-
ever, in our model at least, this extra effort has no bear-
ing on which grants are funded, and thus does not affect
the scientific value of the grants that are awarded. In-
creasing scientific costs without increasing scientific value
will clearly be detrimental to the funding program’s sci-
entific efficiency. Extra-scientific benefits to investigators
can even cause the entire funding program to operate at
a loss to science when paylines are low (Fig. 3).
LOTTERIES
Our model can also be used to analyze the efficiency
of a partial lottery for advancing science. Suppose that
a fraction q ≥ p of proposals qualify for the lottery, and
each qualifying proposal is equally likely to be chosen for
funding. Call q the “lottery line”. Now, the investigator’s
payoff is (p/q)(v0 + v)ηl(x)− (1− k)c(v, x), where ηl(x)
is the equilibrium probability that the proposal qualifies
for the lottery. In Appendix S1, we show that the inves-
tigator’s bid is given by
b(v) = h−1
[
p
q
1
1− k
∫ v
0
v0 + t
g(t)
ξ′l(t) dt
]
(6)
6where ξl(v) = ηl(b(v)).
Our major result for lotteries is that measures of sci-
entific efficiency — expressions 3, 4, and 5 — depend on
the lottery line q but are independent of the payline p
(proofs appear in Appendix S1). This result follows from
the fact that, in a lottery, each investigator’s benefit and
cost are proportional to p. Thus, an investigator’s ROI
and the scientific efficiency of the funding program are
determined by the lottery line, but are not affected by
the payline. To illustrate, Fig. 4 compares an investiga-
tor’s costs and benefits in a proposal competition with
45%, 30%, and 15% paylines vs. a partial lottery with a
q = 45% lottery line and the same three paylines. The
key feature of Fig. 4 is that the investigator’s benefit
curve in a partial lottery scales in such a way that her
ROI is the same for any payline ≤ q. Consequently, a
partial lottery with a lottery line of q and any payline
≤ q achieves the same scientific efficiency as a proposal
competition with a payline of q.
Thus, our numerical results showing the investigator’s
ROI (Fig. 2B) or the scientific efficiency (Fig. 3) in a
funding competition also show the efficiency of a lottery
with the equivalent lottery line. That is, a lottery in
which 45% of applicants qualify for the lottery has the
same scientific efficiency as a proposal competition with
a 45% payline, regardless of the fraction of proposals cho-
sen for the lottery that are ultimately funded. Thus, a
lottery can restore the losses in efficiency that a proposal
competition suffers as paylines become small.
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FIG. 4. An investigator’s ROI falls as the payline drops
in a proposal competition, but is independent of the
payline in a partial lottery. A: Benefit (blue or green) and
cost (red) curves for an investigator with a project at the 90th
percentile of v in a proposal competition. The dark blue, light
blue, and green curves shows benefits with a 45%, 30%, and
15% payline, respectively. Vertical lines show the investiga-
tor’s bid, with the length of the solid portion giving the payoff,
and the length of the dashed portion giving the cost. The in-
vestigator’s ROI declines as the payline decreases. (Note also
that her effort does not vary monotonically with the payline.)
B: The same investigator’s benefit and cost curves in a par-
tial lottery with a 45% lottery line. The investigator’s ROI
is the same for all paylines. These results use the baseline
parameter set given in the main text.
In Appendix S1, we also analyze a more general type
of lottery in which proposals are placed into one of a
small number of tiers, with proposals in more selective
tiers awarded a greater chance of funding [13, 17, 29]. In
a multi-tier lottery, the efficiency is entirely determined
by the number of tiers and the relative probabilities of
funding in each, and is independent of the payline. Nu-
merical results (Fig. S9) illustrate that the scientific value
and waste of a multi-tier lottery fall in between those of
a proposal competition and a single-tier lottery. Thus,
a multi-tier lottery offers an intermediate design that
would partially reduce the waste associated with prepar-
ing proposals, while still allowing review panels to reward
the best proposals with a higher probability of funding.
DISCUSSION
Our major result is that proposal competitions are in-
evitably and inescapably inefficient mechanisms for fund-
ing science when the number of awards is smaller than the
number of meritorious proposals. The contest model pre-
sented here suggests that a partially randomized scheme
for allocating funds — that is, a lottery — can restore
the efficiency lost as paylines fall, albeit at the expense of
reducing the average scientific value of the projects that
are funded.
Why does a lottery disengage efficiency from the pay-
line, while a proposal competition does not? For inves-
tigators, proposal competitions are, to a first approxi-
mation, all-or-nothing affairs — an investigator only ob-
tains a substantial payoff if her grant is funded. At high
paylines (or, more precisely, when the number of awards
matches the number of high-value projects), investiga-
tors with high-value projects can write proposals that
win funding at modest cost to themselves. As the num-
ber of awards dwindles, however, competition stiffens.
Depending on the details of the assessment process, an
investigator with a high-value project must either work
harder for the same chance of funding, or work just as
hard for a smaller chance of funding. Either way, the re-
turn on her investment declines sharply. Thus, a contest
is most efficient at the payline that weeds out low-value
projects, but does not attempt to discriminate among
the high-value projects (e.g., Fig. S6). At lower pay-
lines, however, the effort needed to signal which projects
are most valuable begins to approach the value of those
projects, making the funding program less worthwhile.
In a lottery, investigators do not compete for awards
per se, but instead compete for admission to the lottery.
The value to the investigator of being admitted to the lot-
tery scales directly with the number of awards. It turns
out that both the investigator’s expected benefit and her
costs of participation scale directly with the payline, and
thus the payline has no effect on efficiency. (In Appendix
S1, we follow Hoppe et al. [22] to show that this scaling
can be explained by the economic principle of revenue
equivalence.) If there are fewer awards than high-value
projects, a lottery that weeds out the low-value projects
but does not attempt to discriminate among high-value
7projects will facilitate scientific progress more efficiently
than a contest.
Unfortunately, empirical comparisons between the ef-
ficiencies of funding competitions versus partial lotteries
do not yet exist, to the best of our knowledge. However,
two recent anecdotes support our prediction that the
waste in proposal competitions is driven by the strate-
gic dynamics of the contest itself. First, in 2012, the
U.S. National Science Foundation’s Divisions of Envi-
ronmental Biology and Integrative Organismal Systems
switched from a twice-annual, one-stage proposal compe-
tition to a once-annual, two-stage competition, in part to
reduce applicants’ workload. However, the switch failed
to reduce the applicants’ aggregate workload meaning-
fully [30], and the two-stage mechanism was subsequently
abandoned. Second, in 2014, the National Health and
Medical Research Council of Australia streamlined the
process of applying for their Project Grants, cutting the
length of an application in half [31]. However, researchers
spent more time, not less, preparing proposals after the
process had been streamlined, both individually and in
aggregate [31]. Both of these experiences are consistent
with our prediction that, in a proposal competition, the
effort applicants expend is dictated by the value of fund-
ing to the applicants and the number of awards available,
but does not depend on the particular format of the pro-
posals.
A lottery is a radical alternative, and may be polit-
ically untenable [32]. If a lottery is not viable, an al-
ternative approach to restoring efficiency is to design a
contest where the effort given to competing for awards
has more direct scientific value. For example, a contest
that rewards good science in its completed form — as op-
posed to rewarding well-crafted proposals that describe
future science — motivates the actual practice of good
science, and will be less wasteful at low paylines [9, 14].
Program officers could be given the discretion to allo-
cate some funds by proactively scouting for promising
researchers or projects. Of course, a contest based on
completed science or scouting has its own drawbacks, in-
cluding rich-getting-richer feedback loops, a risk of new
barriers to entry for investigators from historically under-
represented demographic groups, and the Goodhart’s law
phenomenon, whereby a metric that becomes a target
ceases to be a good metric [33]. Nevertheless, it is tan-
talizing to envision a world in which the resources that
universities currently devote to helping researchers write
proposals are instead devoted to helping researchers do
science.
This analysis also shows that extra-scientific profes-
sional incentives to pursue grant funding can damage the
scientific efficiency of a proposal competition. As many of
these extra-scientific incentives arise from administrators
using grant success as a primary yardstick of professional
achievement, perhaps one major benefit of adding ex-
plicit randomness to the funding mechanism would be to
compel administrators to de-emphasize grant success in
professional evaluations. Alternatively, to the degree that
administrators value and reward grant success because
of the associated overhead funds that flow to the univer-
sity, funding agencies could reduce waste by distributing
overhead separately from funding awards. Instead, per-
haps overhead could be allocated based partially on the
recent past productivity of investigators at qualifying in-
stitutions, among other possible criteria. Disengaging
overhead from individual grants would encourage admin-
istrators to value grants for the science those grants en-
able (as opposed to the overhead they bring), while allo-
cating overhead based on institutions aggregate scientific
productivity would motivate universities to help their in-
vestigators produce good science.
Funding agencies often have pragmatic reasons to em-
phasize the meritocratic nature of their award processes.
However, our model also suggests that downplaying el-
ements of a funding competition’s structure that intro-
duce randomness to funding decisions can increase scien-
tific waste. When applicants fail to recognize the degree
to which the contest is already a lottery, they will over-
invest effort in preparing proposals, to the detriment of
science.
This model does not account for all of the costs or
scientific benefits of a proposal competition, including
the costs of administering the competition, the time lost
to reviewing grant proposals, or the benefit of building
scientific community through convening a review panel.
Nonetheless, we suggest that the direct value of the sci-
ence supported by funding awards and the disutility costs
of preparing grant proposals are the predominant scien-
tific benefits and costs of the usual proposal competition
[13, 30], and provide a useful starting point for a more
detailed accounting.
Our model also makes several simplifying assumptions,
each of which may provide scope for interesting future
work. First, researchers pay a time cost to prepare a
proposal, but receive money if the proposal is funded. In
our model, we have converted both time and money into
scientific productivity, in order to place both on a com-
mon footing. To be more explicit, though, scientific pro-
ductivity requires both time and money (among other re-
sources), and researchers may have vastly different needs
for both. In the Appendix, we show that our model can
be formally extended to encompass researchers’ different
needs for time and money if the marginal rate of tech-
nical substitution (that is, the rate at which time and
money can be exchanged without altering scientific pro-
ductivity) is exactly correlated with the project’s scien-
tific value. Our main results still hold in this case, as
long as researchers with the best ideas do not value time
so greatly that they write the weakest proposals. A more
general exploration of researchers’ heterogeneous needs
for time and money — and of how researchers may ad-
just their portfolio of scientific activities when time or
money is scarce — provide ample opportunity for future
work.
Second, our model assumes that the distribution of
the scientific value (v) across possible projects is ex-
8ogeneous to the structure of the funding competition.
This may not be the case if, for instance, a partial lot-
tery encourages participation by investigators with un-
conventional views, reduces the psychological stigma of
previous rejection [16], or discourages investigators ei-
ther who have succeeded under the traditional proposal-
competition format or who perceive a lottery as riskier.
In reality, such feedback loops may endogenize the dis-
tribution of v. Third, our model does not consider the
savings that may accrue to investigators if they can sub-
mit a revised version of a rejected proposal to a differ-
ent or subsequent competition. To a first approxima-
tion, submissions to multiple funders have the effect of
increasing p, which can then be interpreted more gen-
erally as the proportion of ideas that get funded across
all available funding programs. Iterations of revision and
resubmission to the same funding program are likely to
have more complex effects on efficiency and waste. Fi-
nally, our model is silent regarding whether many small
or few large grants will promote scientific progress most
efficiently, and is likewise silent about the factors that
will influence this comparison.
To be sure, much more can be done to embellish this
model. However, the qualitative results — that proposal
competitions become increasingly inefficient as paylines
drop, and that professional pressure on investigators to
pursue funding exacerbates these inefficiencies — are in-
herent to the structure of contests. Partial lotteries and
contests that reward past success present radical alter-
natives for allocating funds, and are sure to be contro-
versial. Nevertheless, whatever their other merits and
drawbacks, these alternatives could restore efficiency in
distributing funds that has been lost as those funds have
become increasingly scarce.
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APPENDIX S1: MATHEMATICAL DETAILS
Bid function
The bid function b(v) can be found following steps that
are identical to the derivation of the first part of Propo-
sition 8 in Hoppe et al. [22]. We repeat that derivation
here, almost fully verbatim.
Begin by dividing the investigator’s payoff function by
by (1 − k)g(v) to rescale the investigator’s optimization
problem (eq. 1) :
b(v) = arg max
x
{
(v0 + v)
(1− k)g(v)η(x)− h(x)
}
. (S1)
Consider two projects of values v1 and v2, v1 > v2, with
equilibrium bids b(v1) and b(v2), respectively. The inves-
tigator with a project of value v1 should not submit a
bid as if her project had value v2, and similarly the in-
vestigator whose project has value v2 should not submit
a bid as if her project had value v1. This yields:
(v0 + v1)
(1− k)g(v1)η(b(v1))− h(b(v1)) ≥
(v0 + v1)
(1− k)g(v1)η(b(v2))− h(b(v2))
(v0 + v2)
(1− k)g(v2)η(b(v2))− h(b(v2)) ≥
(v0 + v2)
(1− k)g(v2)η(b(v1))− h(b(v1)).
Rearrange each inequality to isolate h(b(v1)) − h(b(v2))
and divide through by v1 − v2 to give
(v0+v2)
(1−k)g(v2) (η(b(v1))− η(b(v2)))
v1 − v2 ≤
h(b(v))− h(b(vˆ))
v1 − v2 ≤
(v0+v1)
(1−k)g(v1) (η(b(v1))− η(b(v2)))
v1 − v2 .
Take the limit as v2 → v1 to give
d
dv
h(b(v)) =
v0 + v
(1− k)g(v)
d
dv
η(b(v)). (S2)
Essentially, after rescaling investigators’ benefits and
costs so that the cost function (h(x)) is the same for all
investigators, eq. S2 says that, at equilibrium, an investi-
gator’s marginal (re-scaled) cost and marginal (re-scaled)
benefit of preparing an infinitesimally stronger proposal
are equal [22]. Proceeding with the derivation, multi-
ply both sides of eq. S2 by dv to separate variables and
integrate from 0 to v to obtain∫ v
0
dh(b(t)) =
∫ v
0
v0 + t
(1− k)g(t) ξ
′(t) dt (S3)
where ξ(v) = η(b(v)). Then use h(b(0)) = h(0) = 0 to
give
∫ v
0
dh(b(t)) = h(b(v)), and thus
h(b(v)) =
∫ v
0
v0 + t
(1− k)g(t) ξ
′(t) dt. (S4)
Take h−1 on both sides to complete the derivation.
To make our derivation somewhat more general than in
the main text, suppose that both v0 and k are themselves
functions of v, such that the investigator’s optimization
problem now becomes
b(v) = arg max
x
{
(v0(v) + v)
(1− k(v))g(v)η(x)− h(x)
}
. (S5)
We require the key condition that the quantity
(v0(v)+v)
(1−k(v))g(v) is a strictly increasing function of v, so
that investigators with higher value projects will submit
stronger proposals. This condition rules out the possibil-
ity that, say, variation in v0 or k is large enough that
either replaces v as the primary correlate of proposal
strength. When this key condition holds, the derivation
above proceeds as before, leading to a bid function of
b(v) = h−1
[∫ v
0
v0(t) + t
(1− k(t))g(t) ξ
′(t) dt
]
. (S6)
In this case, variation in v0 or k among investigators may
change the value of investigators’ bids, but it does not
change the rank of investigators’ bids (that is, higher-
value projects are still associated with stronger propos-
als). Because we use a copula to capture noisy assessment
of proposals, an investigator’s probability of funding de-
pends only on the rank of the investigator’s bid, and thus
the portfolio of funded projects does not change.
Finally, we can extend the model to accommodate re-
searchers’ differing needs for time and money, as long
as the marginal rate of technical substitution for time vs.
money is also a function of v. In this case, we re-interpret
the cost function c(v, x) = g(v)h(x) as the time cost of
writing a proposal, and we assume that the monetary cost
of writing a proposal is negligible. Let φ be a conversion
factor that converts time into scientific productivity, such
that the disutility cost of writing a proposal in terms of
lost productivity is φc(v, x). Moreover, suppose φ is also
a function of v. Then, we can write the investigator’s
optimization problem as
b(v) = arg max
x
{(v0(v) + v)η(x)− (1− k(v))φ(v)g(v)h(x)} .
(S7)
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As before, we require the key condition that
(v0(v)+v)
(1−k(v))φ(v)g(v) is a strictly increasing function of v,
to ensure that proposal strength is positively corre-
lated with scientific value at equilibrium. Under this
condition, the same steps give a bid function of
b(v) = h−1
[∫ v
0
v0(t) + t
(1− k(t))φ(t)g(t) ξ
′(t) dt
]
. (S8)
To demonstrate that b(v) maximizes the investiga-
tor’s payoff (as opposed to minimizing it), we follow
Moldovanu & Sela’s [20] “pseudo-concavity” argument.
This argument requires that b′(v) > 0, which we estab-
lish first. To do so, note that h−1 in eq. 2 is an increasing
function (because h is an increasing function), and that
(v0 + t)/g(t) > 0 in the integrand of eq. 2. Thus, to
show that b′(v) > 0, it suffices to show that ξ′(v) > 0,
that is, that the probability of being funded increases as
the value of the scientific project increases. We expect
this condition to hold under any reasonable model of how
proposals are assessed. Basic but tedious calculus estab-
lishes that it does hold for the Clayton copula that we
describe below.
Having established that b′(v) > 0, the pseudo-
concavity argument of Moldovanu & Sela [20] proceeds
as follows. Let $(v, x) = (v0 + v)η(x)− (1− k)g(v)h(x)
be the payoff associated with a project of value v and a
proposal of quality x. Let $x = ∂$(v, x)/∂x. We claim
that $x > 0 for x < b(v), and $x < 0 for x > b(v).
These claims, together with the continuity of b(v), estab-
lish that x = b(v) maximizes $(v, x).
We first show that $x > 0 for x < b(v). Choose a
value of x < b(v), and let v? be the value of a project
that will generate a bid of x, that is, b(v?) = x. Because
b′(v) > 0, it follows that v? < v. Simple differentiation
gives
$x(v, x) = (v0 + v)η
′(x)− (1− k)g(v)h′(x). (S9)
Now differentiate $x with respect to v to give the mixed
derivative
$xv(v, x) = η
′(x)− (1− k)g′(v)h′(x). (S10)
Under the assumptions of our model, η′(x) > 0, g′(v) <
0, and h′(x) > 0; thus, $xv > 0. Therefore, $x is an
increasing function of v, and thus $x(v
?, x) < $x(v, x).
By virtue of the fact that b(v?) = x, we have $x(v
?, x) =
0. Therefore, $x(v, x) > 0.
The proof that $x < 0 for x > b(v) follows similarly.
Copulas for noisy assessment
A bivariate copula is simply a bivariate probability dis-
tribution on the unit square with uniform marginal dis-
tributions [26]. Let U = F (v) be the actual quantile
of a proposal, and let W be the assessed quantile. The
joint distribution of U and W is given by the copula
C(u,w) = Pr{U ≤ u,W ≤ w}. Given a value of U , the
conditional distribution of W given U is CW |U (u,w) =
Pr{W ≤ w|U = u} = ∂C(u,w)/∂u. (Here we use the fact
that U is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.) To
find ξ(v), evaluate CW |U at u = F (v) and w = 1 − p to
find 1−ξ(v), the probability that an idea of value v is not
funded. Take the complement to find ξ(v). Differentiate
with respect to v to find ξ′(v), which can then be plugged
in to eq. 2.
The distribution function for a Clayton copula [27] is
[26, §4.2]
C(u,w) = (u−θ + w−θ − 1)−1/θ . (S11)
The parameter θ ≥ 0 controls the strength of the associ-
ation between U and W , with larger values of θ giving
stronger associations (i.e., more accurate assessment of
grant proposals).
Alternative parameter sets
To complement the example in the main text, we show
numerical results for two alternative parameter sets. In
the first alternative set, scientific value is uniformly dis-
tributed across projects, the disutility cost increases lin-
early with proposal quality, and assessment is less precise
than we assume in the baseline parameter set. In this set,
v is uniformly distributed between 1/3 and 1. We use
c(v, x) = xe−v for the cost function, and we use θ = 5 in
the Clayton copula (Fig. S2B).
The second alternative parameter set captures a sce-
nario where the pool of possible project values is bi-
modal, with many minimal-value projects and equally
many maximal-value projects. In this alternative set,
v ranges from 1/2 to 1. To construct the distribution
of v, let Y be a beta random variable with both shape
parameters equal to 1/2. Thus, Y has a symmetric,
U-shaped distribution on the unit interval. Then v is
given by (1 + Y )/2. In this parameter set, we choose
c(v, x) = (1.5 − v)x2, and we set θ = 7.5 in the Clayton
copula.
Both alternative parameter sets use k = 1/3.
Perfect discrimination
In the perfect discrimination case, we require that
there is a maximum possible value of v, which we write
vmax. The previous derivation of the bid function does
not work for perfect discrimination, because b(v) becomes
a step function and thus is not differentiable. Instead, let
v? denote the threshold value, that is, v? = F−1(1− p).
Under perfect discrimination, the threshold investigator
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will break even regardless of her bid. Thus,
η(x) =

gk(v
?)h(x)
v0 + v?
x ≤ x?
1 x > x?
(S12)
where
x? = h−1
[
v0 + v
?
gk(v?)
]
. (S13)
Consequently, it is straightforward to show that the bid
function is
b(v) =
{
x? v > v?
0 v < v?.
(S14)
The following results are all immediate. First, as the
payline drops, v? increases, and hence x? increases. (Re-
call that g is a strictly decreasing function, and h−1 is
a strictly increasing function.) Thus, investigators with
v > v? experience a reduced payoff and increased costs,
leading to a reduced ROI. Second, the average scientific
benefit per funded proposal, which can be written as∫ vmax
v?
v dF (v)
/∫ vmax
v?
dF (v), (S15)
increases as v? increases. Third, as p approaches 0 from
above, v? approaches vmax from below. Thus, in the
limit, the bid function approaches
lim
p→0+
b(v) =
h−1
[
v0 + vmax
gk(vmax)
]
v = vmax
0 v < vmax.
(S16)
Thus, the payoff to all investigators approaches 0 as p
approaches 0 from above.
Lotteries
We consider the more general case of a multi-tier lot-
tery. Proposals deemed worthy of funding are placed
into one of z tiers, with tier 1 representing the highest-
ranked proposals, etc. Write the proportion of propos-
als in tier i as qi, and let pii represent the probabil-
ity that a proposal placed in tier i is funded, where
1 ≥ pi1 > pi2 > . . . > piz > 0. We assume that the fund-
ing agency determines q1, q2, . . . , qz and pi1, pi2, . . . , piz in
advance. Because the payline is still p, we must have∑z
i=1 qipii = p. The single-tier lottery proposed by Fang
& Casadevall [16] and others is a special case with z = 1,
with a probability of funding pi1 = p/q1 in that tier.
In a tiered lottery, the investigator’s maximization
problem becomes
b(v) = arg max
x
{
(v0 + v)
z∑
i=1
piiηi(x)− (1− k)c(v, x)
}
(S17)
where ηi(x) is the probability that a proposal of quality
x is placed in tier i. A similar derivation to the steps in
eq. S2–S4 yields the bid function
b(v) = h−1
[
z∑
i=1
pii
1− k
∫ v
0
v0 + t
g(t)
ξ′i(t) dt
]
. (S18)
where ξi(v) = ηi(b(v)).
We now show that the efficiency of a lottery depends
entirely on the structure of the lottery, and is indepen-
dent of the payline. For multi-tier lotteries, we require
that the ratios of the pii’s — the probabilities of funding
in each tier — are fixed. To establish these ratios, write
κi = pii/pi1. The condition
∑z
i=1 qipii = p implies that
the probability that a proposal in tier i is funded is
pii =
pκi∑
i κiqi
, (S19)
as long as p ≤ ∑i κiqi. (If p > ∑i κiqi, then we would
have pi1 > 1.)
All of our results follow from showing that an investi-
gator’s benefit and cost are proportional to p, and thus
the payline p cancels out of the efficiency calculations in
eqq. 3–5. The investigator’s benefit from entering the
competition is (v0 + v)
∑z
i=1 piiηi(x). A simple substitu-
tion shows that this benefit is proportional to p:
(v0 + v)
z∑
i=1
piiηi(x) = (v0 + v)
z∑
i=1
pκiηi(x)∑
j κjqj
= p(v0 + v)
∑
i ηi(x)κi∑
j κjqj
.
To show that the investigator’s cost is proportional to
p, we have
c(v, b(v)) = g(v)h(b(v))
= g(v)
z∑
i=1
pii
1− k
∫ v
0
v0 + t
g(t)
ξ′i(t) dt
= p g(v)
∑
i κi
∫ v
0
v0+t
g(t) ξ
′
i(t) dt
(1− k)∑j κjqj .
It thus follows that the investigator’s ROI (eq. 3), the
average value per funded grant (eq. 4), and the average
waste per funded grant (eq. 5) are all independent of p.
Hoppe et al. [22] provide an argument based on the
economic principle of revenue equivalence that explains
why costs are independent of the payline in a lottery.
This argument applies both to proposal competitions and
to lotteries of any structure, and it applies regardless
of whether panels discriminate perfectly among propos-
als, or not. The argument is most easily explained in a
single-tier lottery with perfect discrimination, so we con-
sider that setting. First, for revenue equivalence to apply,
we need to re-scale the model so that only benefits vary
among investigators. That is, re-scale the investigator’s
equilibrium benefit function to
p
q
(v0 + v)
(1− k)g(v)ξl(v) (S20)
13
and write her cost function as h(x). Having re-scaled
the investigator’s benefits and costs, the principle of rev-
enue equivalence suggests that the (re-scaled) cost paid
by an investigator will be exactly equal to the negative
externality that her entrance into the competition cre-
ates, that is, the amount by which her entrance decreases
the aggregate benefit of the competing investigators [22].
With perfect discrimination, the threshold investigator
(the last one to qualify for the lottery) has project value
v? = F−1(1 − q); every investigator with v > v? quali-
fies for the lottery, while every investigator with v < v?
opts out. Consider an investigator with an idea of value
v. If v < v?, then this investigator’s entrance into the
competition has no effect on other investigators’ benefit,
and thus the cost she pays is 0 (i.e., she opts out). If
the investigator has an idea of value v > v?, then she
knocks one threshold investigator out of the lottery. No
other investigator’s benefit changes. Thus, the new in-
vestigator’s presence decreases the aggregate benefit of
the other investigators by
p
q
(v0 + v
?)
(1− k)g(v?) . (S21)
This negative externality is exactly the re-scaled cost that
she pays, i.e.,
h(b(v)) =
p
q
(v0 + v
?)
(1− k)g(v?) . (S22)
Multiplying by g(v) undoes the re-scaling to give the ac-
tual cost paid:
c(v, b(v)) = g(v)h(b(v)) = g(v)
p
q
(v0 + v
?)
(1− k)g(v?) . (S23)
Two observations explain why the cost paid by the in-
vestigator is directly proportional to p. First, the identity
of the threshold investigator — the one who is knocked
out of the lottery when an investigator with a higher-
value project enters — is determined by q, not p. (In a
proposal competition, the threshold investigator is deter-
mined by p.) Second, the threshold investigator’s benefit
— and hence the negative externality imposed by the
newly arriving investigator — is directly proportional to
p. Thus, the (re-scaled) cost paid by any investigator will
also be directly proportional to p. Multiplying the cost
by g(v) to undo the rescaling does not change the direct
proportionality to p.
With noisy assessment, and/or in a multi-tiered lot-
tery, the negative externality that an investigator im-
poses on the field, and hence the (re-scaled) cost that
she pays at equilibrium, integrates the amount by which
her entry decreases the benefit of every investigator with
a project value less than hers. (This is one way to under-
stand the bid functions in eq. 2, 6, and S18.) In a lottery,
everyone’s benefit is proportional to p, and hence each
investigator’s negative externality, and the cost that she
pays, is proportional to p as well.
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FIG. S1. Funding rates of NIH R01 and equivalents from
FY 1962 – FY 2016. Data from FY 1962 – 2008 include
R01, R23, R29, and R37 proposals, as reported by NIH’s
Office of Extramural Research [34]. 1962 – 1969 data are
NIH estimates. Data for FY 2009 – 2016 include R01 and
R37 proposals, as reported by [2]. (R01 and R37 provide the
vast majority of proposals for earlier years.) Data include
new applications, supplements, and renewals, and the success
rate is calculated as the number of proposals funded divided
by the number of proposals reviewed.
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FIG. S2. Random samples from copula distributions used
to model error in assessment of grant proposals. A: Clayton
copula with θ = 10. B: Clayton copula with θ = 5. Blue
dashed lines give the median of the assessed quantile as a
function of the actual quantile.
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FIG. S3. Parallel results to Fig. 2, except with the first alter-
native parameter set given in the SI.
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FIG. S4. Parallel results to Fig. 2, except with the second
alternative parameter set.
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FIG. S5. Parallel results to Fig. 3, except with the first alter-
native parameter set given in the SI. Note that the vertical
axis in panel A does not extend to 0.
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FIG. S6. Parallel results to Fig. 3, except with the second
alternative parameter set given in the SI. In this figure, data
are shown for paylines ranging from p = 0.001 to p = 0.999.
Note that the vertical axis in panel A does not extend to 0.
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FIG. S7. Parallel results to Fig. 2, except with perfect as-
sessment of grant quality. All other parameter values are the
same as in Fig. 2.
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FIG. S8. Parallel results to Fig. 3, except with perfect assess-
ment of proposal strength. All other parameter values are the
same as in Fig. 3. Note that the vertical axis in panel A does
not extend to 0.
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FIG. S9. Parallel results to Fig. 3 for a three-tier lottery with
equally sized tiers and a 3:2:1 ratio of funding probabilities
across the tiers. The horizontal axis gives the proportion of
proposals that qualify for any tier of the lottery. Scientific
value and scientific waste per funded proposal are independent
of the actual payline, as long as the payline is less than 2/3 of
the lottery line. (If the payline exceeds 2/3 of the lottery line,
then the ratios of funding across tiers will be something other
than 3:2:1, and thus the average value and average cost of
a funded proposal will change slightly.) All other parameter
values are the same as in Fig. 3. Note that the vertical axis
in panel A does not extend to 0.
